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The Asian crisis has resurrected once again, and even more intensely, the debate about the
origins of crises and the behavior of investors at the onset of financial turmoils. Many have argued
in favor of a  "fundamentals" approach.  That  is, crises occur when the economy is in a state of
distress with a deteriorating current account, a growth slowdown or even a deep recession, the
bursting of stock and real state  price bubbles, and short-term foreign debt reaching dangerous
levels (see, for example, Corsetti,  Pesenti, and Roubini, 1998; Kaminsky, 1998; and Krugman,
1979). Many others have argued in favor of self-fulfilling  crises with collapses of the pegs even in
countries with immaculate market fundamentals (see, for example, Eichengreen  and Wyplosz, 1993,
and Obstfeld, 1996). Even for those that  support the "fundamentals" approach to the crisis, it is
very difficult to pinpoint the exact timing of the crisis based just  on the behavior of fundamentals
(see, for example, Kaminsky and Reinhart, 1996). While most of the "fundamentalists" argue that
extended credit is at the core of crises,'  they have to concede, like Kindleberger (1978), that  the
fuel that  ignites a crisis "may be some incident which snaps the confidence  of the system [and]
makes people think of the dangers of failure" (page 107). That is, rumors may be the trigger to a
speculative attack.
In the new literature of the 1990s,  rumors take a life of their own, with rational investors not
confirming rumors and following  the herd. In this new framework,  speculative attacks occur even
when market fundamentals are not deteriorating, as in the fundamentals approach, and even when
governments are not validating expectations, as in the self-fulfilling  attack literature.  The new
literature on herding behavior starts  with the hypothesis that  it is costly to acquire information.
These information frictions can make investors follow  the market, rather  than take the time and
expense to make their own assessments about market fundamentals (see, for example, Banerjee,
1992).  The  "herding" behavior approach has  also supporters in international  economics.  For
1  The source of extended credit varies  across  models. For example,  Krugman (1979)  focuses  on the
monetization  of government  deficits  while  McKinnon  and Pill (1994)  stress  the role  of foreign  capital  inflows
channeled  through domestic  banks,  deposit  insurance,  moral hazard,  and overlending.-2-
example,  Calvo and Mendoza  (1995) argue that  the volatility  of capital  at the  onset of the Mexican
crisis in  1994 can be explained,  in part,  by herding  behavior.
The possibility  that  rational  investors  take portfolio  decisions without  paying  too much atten-
tion to the  state  of the economy may  be at  the  base of the  "excess volatility"  of financial markets.
Still,  there  can  be different  mechanisms  and  conditions  that  generate  this  weak relation  between
market  fundamentals  and  capital  flows.  For example,  Calvo  and  Mendoza  (1997)  focus  on  the
effects of the globalization  of financial markets.  In that  paper,  as the number  of markets  grows and
the  share of that  country's  assets  in the  investor's  portfolio  declines,  the  payoff of gathering  infor-
mation  on  country-specific  information  becomes  smaller  and  the  incentives  for herding  behavior
grow stronger.
In Rigobon  (1998) investors  are also confused about  the true  fundamentals  -they  do not know
the  productivity  of the  domestic  capital-  and  thus  face a signal extraction  problem  when making
their  investment  decisions.  In this  paper,  agents observe a signal every period,  with the  quality  of
the  signal  depending  on the  level of investment.  In particular,  it is assumed  that  the  quality  of
a  good  signal declines  with  the  level of investment.  The  intuition  behind  this  assumption,  as the
author  describes  it,  is that  an economy might be booming,  not because  its fundamentals  are good,
but  because  agents'  actions  are  fueling  the  economy.  Thus,  good  signals  are  informative  at  the
onset  of a boom  in investment  and  become  less informative  as the  boom  in investment  matures.
Similarly,  bad  signals  are  informative  at  the  onset  of a recession  but  as the  recession  progresses,
they  also become less informative.
In Kodres  and  Pritsker  (1998), information  asymmetries  and  the  ability  to  cross-hedge  using
other  asset  markets  are at  the root  of financial contagion,  with  international  market  comovement
occurring  in  the  absence  of any  relevant  information  and  even in  the  absence  of direct  common
factors  across countries.  For example,  a negative  shock to  one country  can lead informed  investors
to sell that  country's  assets  and  buy assets  of another  country, increasing  their  exposure  to the  id-
iosyncratic  factor of the second country.  Investors can hedge this  new position  by. selling the  assets-3-
of a third country, completing the chain of contagion from the first country to the third country.
Information asymmetries can greatly magnify this contagion effect.  This is because uninformed
investors do not know whether the demand changes that they observe within a market following  a
shock are due to the hedging of macroeconomic  risk across markets, or due to informed investors
trading on private information within the market.  Interestingly, this model also suggests an ex-
planation for why financial markets have been more susceptible to contagion after an outbreak of
banking and financial crises, as has been the case in Asia in 1997. The reason lies, as discussed
by Kodres and Pritsker, in the increase in informational asymmetries brought about by the col-
lapse of credit markets. When credit markets are not functioning properly, firms' survival will be
tightly linked to their ability to access emergency lines of credit.  Hard to obtain information on
alternative sources of credit makes informed investors knowledge  on credit markets very valuable
and  accentuates informational asymmetries and contagion.  In contrast,  in tranquil  times, most
companies are not credit-constrained, making the informational advantage of the informed traders
less crucial. With  information asymmetries diminishing, the magnitude of the contagion effects
will fall.
The different theories suggest varying reactions of financial markets to news. According  to the
hypothesis of self-fulfilling  attacks, rumors, on average, have persistent effects on financial markets
because governments  validate rumors and implement policies that deteriorate market fundamentals.
In contrast, according to the fundamentals approach, rumors may have less persistent effects if they
are unrelated to market fundamentals. Herding behavior models also have some predictions about
the incentives to acquire information. For example, in Calvo and Mendoza (1997), investors have
less incentive to gather good news in a bull market, with incentives  to verify good news increasing in
a bear market. Hence, good rumors generate more herding behavior and thus possibly over-reaction
in good times.
While theories abound, the empirical evidence on the process of acquisition of information is
still very scarce. Rather than limiting our analysis to the test of one particular model of herding-4-
or  fundamental  behavior  of investors,  the  goal  of this  paper  is to  fill the  void  in  the  empirical
literature  and  examine  the reaction  of financial  markets  to news, either  rumors or fundamentals  in
crisis episodes.  Presumably,  it is in these  episodes  when  contagion  effects could  be at  their  peak
(see, Kodres  and  Pritsker  (1998)).  We examine  the  Asian crisis from  the  beginning  of 1997 until
the end  of May 1998. In particular,  we focus on the  analysis of financial markets  of nine  countries:
Hong Kong, Indonesia,  Japan,  Korea,  Malaysia, Philippines,  Singapore,  Taiwan, and  Thailand.  As
always  during  crisis times,  the  amount  of daily  news  and  rumors  increases  dramatically  making
it hard  to  control  for every  piece of new information.  Thus,  in our  initial  study  of the  behavior
of financial  markets  during  the  Asian  crisis,  we concentrate  on  the  days of market  jitters,  which
we define  as the  twenty  largest  one-day  changes  (downturns  or upturns)  in each country's  stock
market  prices . This reduces  our study  to the  analysis of just  one hundred  eighty  daily changes in
all countries  in our  sample.
We review the  coincident  reports  in the international  financial  press to  examine the  causes of
the  extreme  one-day  market  changes.  News releases  about  monetary  and  fiscal policies or about
agreements  with  the  International  Monetary  Fund,  about  the  state  of the economy or even about
political  stability  are at  the  core of market  jitters.  However, sometimes  market  volatility  increases
even in  the  absence  of any news.  Interestingly,  market-moving  news  releases  are not  always of a
local origin, suggesting  spillover effects across countries.  This  paper  examines  not only the impact
effect of news but also the  effect of news over time  to see whether  the  largest swings in stock prices
indicate  a change in the  mood of investors.
The rest  of the  paper  is organized  as follows. The  next  section  presents  a short  chronology of
the  crisis and  reports  the  distribution  of the individual  stock returns  over the sample  and  in days
of market  jitters.  Section  3 describes  our classification  of the  news.  Sections 4 and  5 are the  core
of the  paper  and  report  all the  results  about  what  triggers  market  jitters.  Section  6 concludes.-5-
2.  A Characterization  of Markets  in Crisis
To motivate our classification  of the news that rocks markets, we first-present a brief chronology
of the crisis. Next, we describe the distribution  of stock market returns during the crisis and in
days of market jitters.
2.1 A Chronology  of the  Crisis 2
While the official  onset of the Asian crisis is marked by the devaluation of the Thai baht on
July 2, 1997, the speculative attack against some of the Asian currencies starts  earlier on.  For
example, the first episode of notable pressure on the Thai baht occurred in July 1996,  following  the
collapse of the Bangkok Bank of Commerce  and the injections of liquidity by the Bank of Thailand
to support  the financial system.  The attack peaks on May 14, 1997 amid concerns of political
instability, with the stock market declining almost 7 percent.  Concerns about the baht heighten
on June  19, when Thailand's  Finance Minister Virava -a  supporter  of the peg- resigns and the
stock market suffers one of the largest declines (about 11 percent). The suspension of operations of
16 cash-strapped finance companies fuels more worries about the fragility of the financial  sector in
Thailand and leads to further withdrawals  of foreign funds, which in turn trigger the floating of the
Thai baht on July 2. The abandonment of the peg in Thailand is followed  by a more freely float
of the Philippines peso on July 11 and the abandomnent of the defense  of the Malaysian ringitt on
July 14.
With the crisis still confined to these countries, volatility in financial markets surges dramat-
ically, fueled in part by inflammatory statements by government officials. For example, on July
24, the ringgit hits a 38-month low, following  Malaysian Prime Minister Mahathir bitter  attack
on  "rogue speculators."  But market jitters  are also prompted by the  introduction (or elimina-
tion) of restrictions on financial market transactions.  For example, on September 3, the Malaysian
2  This section  draws  from Baig  and Goldfajn  (1998);  FRankel  and Schmukler  (1998);  Kaufman,  Mehrez,
and Schmukler  (1998);  Radelet  and Sachs  (1998);  and Roubini  (1998).-6-
government  bans  short-selling  on equity  markets  and  imposes restrictions  on  forward  sales of the
ringgit,  with the stock market  in Kuala Lumpur  collapsing about  8 percent.  Restrictions  are partly
removed  on September  5, leading  to  a stock  market  rally in Malaysia  and  neighboring  countries.
Thus,  while  economic  fragility  is  at  the  core  of the  crisis,  political  uncertainty  provokes  more
instability  in financial  markets.
By August  1997, the crisis has engulfed Indonesia,  with the  rupiah  starting  to float on August
14. In October,  the currency  crisis spreads  to Taiwan,  with the devaluation  of the Taiwanese dollar
creating  doubts  about  the  sustainability  of the  Hong  Kong dollar  peg.  Tension  escalates  in the
region and  in a matter  of days,  the  Hang  Seng index loses about  30 percent.3 The announcement
of the  financial  aid  package  for Indonesia  on  November  3 helps  to  restore  calm  to  the  region.4
However, the  calm is not long lasting  and  the  crisis continues  to  spread.  Now the  epicenter  of the
crisis moves to Korea,  with  stocks collapsing  around  Asia on November  7 as currency jitters  shock
Korea.  Only  the  reports  leading  to  the  announcement  that  Korea  would  seek  a rescue  package
from the  IMF  on  November  21 calm  markets  somewhat.  However,  the  gains  are  short-lived,  as
the  stock market  loses all its gains  after the  announcement  takes  place  and  it becomes  clear that
growth  will collapse  in  response  to  the  increase  in taxes  and  spending  cuts  required  in the  IMF
bailout  package.
As the  Korean  crisis continues  to  deepen,  Japan  also  starts  to  take  the  center  of the  stage
after  the  announcement  on  November  24  that  Yamaichi  Securities  Co.  Ltd.,  the  fourth  largest
securities  house in  Japan,  is closing its  doors.  In December  the  crisis escalates,  with  rumors  that
the  Indonesian  President  Suharto  is extremely  ill and  concerns that  Korea's  financial  crisis could
lead to  a debt  moratorium.  On December  11, Korean  financial markets  experience  further  declines
3  Interestingly, while during the period October 20 to November 3 the Hang Seng index experiences  eight
of the largest fluctuations, there is basically a complete absence of any relevant news, economic  or political,
local or foreign, explaining those market jitters.
4  On that  day, Hong Kong sees some of the most dramatic gains, with the Hang Seng index rising about
6 percent during the day.-7-
following Moody's downgrade of Korea's foreign currency bonds.  On December 19, foodstuff
trader Toshoku Ltd files for bankrupcy, raising the specter of more to  follow, and the Japanese
stock market collapses. By early January, Indonesia adds to the ongoing panic by reneging on
promised structural  reforms.
By mid-January, somewhat calmer markets return  on news that  international banks have
agreed to roll over much of Korea's short-term debt  and as Korea is upgraded by international
credit  companies on January  19.  Indonesia's willingness to  agree to  a  tough IMF  package is
also welcomed. Again, calm proves to be short-lived as Indonesia starts  to flirt with the idea of
introducing a currency board and the IMF makes clear that is not going to support the Indonesian
plans to peg the rupiah to the dollar. From February onwards up to the end of May, markets do
not stage a comeback  nor do they collapse, with markets rallying somewhat on the announcement
of trade surpluses in Thailand (March 13) and tumbling on news of unrest and looting in Indonesia
(May 6, May 13-18). Our sample ends in May with the resignation of President Suharto.
2.2 Financial  Markets  in  Crisis:  Returns  and  Volatility
The crisis that  erupts in Thailand in July 1997 engulfs, within a couple of months, Indone-
sia, Hong Kong, Japan,  Korea, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore, and Taiwan.  This section
examines the behavior of stock markets in these nine countries. 5
As it is traditional in the empirical literature that  examines the behavior of world-wide stock
markets, we focus our analysis on the national stock indices  valued in U.S. dollars. Table 1 provides
some stylized evidence  on the behavior of stock markets in these countries in the 1990-1996  period
and since 1997. The table displays for each country the mean, standard deviation, minimum, and
maximum of the daily percent changes in stock market prices.  While in the  early 1990s, stock
5  The nine stock indices  in the sample  are: Hang Seng  Stock Index (Hong  Kong),  Jakarta Composite
Index (Indonesia),  Nikkei  500 (Japan), Korea  Composite  Index (Korea),  Kuala Lumpur  Index (Malaysia),
Philippines  Composite  Index (Philippines),  Stock Exchange  of Singapore  All Index (Singapore),  Taiwan
Weighted  Index (Taiwan),  and the Stock  Exchange  of Thailand  (Thailand).markets  in Asia soar, increasing  about  0.04 percent  on average per  day, between  January  1997 and
May 1998 the  average daily  change in these markets  is negative for all markets  except  Taiwan.  For
instance,  stock markets  in  Indonesia,  Korea,  and  Thailand  decline  at  an average  0.53,  0.32,  and
0.27 percent  per  day, respectively.  Volatility  also surges dramatically.  For example,  the  standard
deviation  of the daily  changes in prices increases from an average of 1.4 percent  in the  early  1990s
to  2.9 percent  since  January  1997, with  maximum  daily  moves increasing  from an  average of 8.0
percent  to  15.4 percent  over all countries.  While  volatility  increases  on  average in  all countries  in
the region,  Indonesian  and Korean  financial markets  are the ones that  exhibit  more jittery  financial
markets,  with daily  changes reaching  20 percent  in the  case of Korea  and  about  29 percent  in the
case  of Indonesia.  Only  Taiwan  exhibits  less volatility  since  1997 when  compared  to  the  early
1990s.
Figure  1 plots  stock market  prices  in the  nine  countries  in our  sample.  The  figure also shows
the  days of extreme  market  volatility  for  each country,  the  twenty  days with  largest  (positive  or
negative)  daily  changes  in the  stock market,  which are  the  focus of our paper.  Note  that  market
jitters  start  earlier  in Thailand,  with  about  eight  of the  largest  daily  changes occurring  before the
beginning  of October.  In contrast,  December  1997 and  January  1998 are the most volatile  months
in  Korea,  with  thirteen  out  of the  twenty  big changes  taking  place  during  those  months.  The
collapse  in Indonesia  starts  even later,  with fifteen of all the  twenty largest  daily changes occurring
in 1998. Interestingly,  while there  is a pronounced  negative  trend  in all markets  since 1997, about
seventy six of the one hundred  and eighty largest changes are positive.  This suggests large reversals
in the  mood  of investors.  In  fact,  as  already  shown in  Table  1, stock  market  returns  in days  of
market  jitters  are  on average positive  for about  one third  of the countries.
Part  of the increase  in volatility  in the dollar  value of stock prices since  1997 reflects volatility
in  the  exchange  rate.  To examine  the  contribution  of exchange rate  fluctuations  to  the  volatility
of the  stock market  index in U.S. dollars,  we decompose  the  daily  fluctuations  into movements  in
the stock index  in local currency  and  movements  in the exchange  rate.  The  bottom  right  panel  in-9-
Figure 1 reports the contribution of exchange rateifmovements  to the daily fluctuations of the stock
indices in U.S. dollars in days of market jitters  and over all the sample (January 1, 1997 to May
25, 1998). The exchange rate effect varies somewhat across countries. For example, in one extreme
is Hong Kong with a fixed exchange rate system in the sample examined and all the movements in
financial markets reflecting only fluctuations in stock prices in local currency. On'the opposite end
is Indonesia, with a dramatic collapse of the value of the rupiah. In 'this  last case, exchange rate
movements explain about 70 percent of the daily change of the stock index in dollars since 1997.
For the rest of the countries, movements in the exchange rate explain about 50 percent or less of
the daily fluctuations of the stock market index in dollars.
Figure 2 displays the distribution of the largest swings  over time, distinguishing between rallies
(the positive bars) and collapses (the negative bars).6 The height of market volatility occurs in
the months of October through January. In fact, volatility jumps on October 28, when the Hong
Kong market  collapses, with seven out  of the  nine countries posting losses averaging about  9
percent. During November and December, a total of 47 large fluctuations take place, of which 27
are negative. Markets rebound sharply in mid-January. Seven out of the nine countries post large
gains on January  14 and six out of nine on January  19. Markets remain jittery  to some dtegree
until February, calming somewhat after mid-February 1998. These large swings are the focus of
the paper.
3.  The  News  that  Rocks  Financial  Markets
As examined  in  Section  2, the  news  that  rocks  financial  markets  during  the  Asian  crisis  is
not confined to  economic  news.  In fact,  political  events,  such  as the  resignation  of the  President
Suharto  in Indonesia,  are  also  at  the  heart  of the  gyrations  of financial  markets  since  January
1997.  Thus,  to study  the  onset  and  propagation  of the  Asian  crisis,  it  is important  to  collect all
news, local and  foreign, that  can provide information  to investors  on both  the state  of the economy
6  For example, a bar equal to three means that three markets experience  large rallies on that day.- 10  -
and  future  policy  actions.  Our source  of information  is Bloomberg,  however, we checked  that  the
analysis in Bloomberg  is consistent  with that  of financial  newspapers,  such as the Financial  Times,
and  find that  the  alternative  sources of information  largely coincide.7
News releases are classified according to the  country  of origin and  the sector in which the  news
originates.  News can originate  in more than  one country,  and  there  might  be news from more than
one sector  in any given day.  In our  sample,  all news releases originate  in the  nine  countries  in our
sample or in the United  States  and China.  We classify news in eight categories:  (1) agreements with
international  organizations  or financial community;  (2) credit  ratings  by international  agencies; (3)
economic news, including  both  real, financial,  and  external  sectors  news;  (4) monetary  policy; (5)
fiscal policy;  (6)  political  news, including  political  events  and  talk;  (7) capital  controls;  and  (8)
"no news."  In turn,  we classify all  the  releases  of information  by the  country  of origin.  For each
country,  foreign  news releases  are the  ones originated  in  any  of the  neighbor  countries  or in the
United  States.
As summarized  in Table  2, most of the large price changes are related  to local news (74 percent
on average for all countries),  with  the swings in stock prices in Indonesia,  Japan,  and  Korea  being
the  ones that  are  most  related  to  domestic  news  (19, 20,  and  18 out  of 20  news for  each  stock
market,  respectively).  Still, for some countries,  foreign  news matters  the  most.  For example,  the
news releases that  move markets  in Singapore  are mostly  of a foreign origin.  Regarding  the type  of
news that  generates  market  jitters,  33 events (18 percent)  are of a political  nature,  29 (16 percent)
are related  to economic news, and  23 (13 percent)  are related  to agreements  with  the international
community.  Finally,  in 62 events  (34 percent),  the  fluctuations  of stock  prices cannot  be linked to
the  release of economic  or other  information. 8
7  The Appendix Table tallies the identifiable sources of news that move financial markets in the selected
days, along with the associated percentage changes in the stock market index in the nine countries and our
classification  of the news. It also reports in bold characters the returns in days of market jitters.
8  Interestingly, the absence of fundamental economic or political news coincident with many of the
dramatic stock market moves  in the nine Asian countries since January 1997  is not exceptional. For example,
Kaminsky (1998) finds that  about half of the largest U.S. stock market swings since the beginning of the- 11  -
The press information  is then  transformed  into dummy  variables,  so as to  be able to  estimate
the  impact  of all the  different  news on the  markets.  These  dummy  variables  take  a value of 1, -1
when  there  are  information  releases  and  zero  if in a specific day  there  is no news related  to  that
particular  type  of information.  In particular,  the  variable agreements  with  multilateral  or bilateral
organizations  and the international  financial community takes the value 1 (-1) whenever the country
accepts  or becomes  closer  to  (moves away from)  accepting  an  agreement  with  these  institutions
and  0 otherwise.  The variable credit  rating  agencies takes the value 1 whenever international  credit
agencies  upgrade  a country,  -1 whenever they  downgrade  it,  and  0 otherwise.
The  variable  capturing  information  on  the  economy is equal  to  1 (-1) when  the  releases sug-
gest a  better  (worse) outlook  for either  the  financial, real, or external  sectors  of the economy. The
variable  for monetary  policy is equal  to  1 (-1) when  the  releases of information  suggest  an expan-
sionary  (contractionary)  monetary  policy and  0 otherwise.  The variable  fiscal policy is equal  to  1
whenever  the government  pursues  expansionary  fiscal policy, -1 whenever  the governments  pursues
contractionary  fiscal policy, and  0 otherwise.  The variable  capital  controls  takes  the value  1 when-
ever  restrictions  on capital  movements  are lifted,  -1 whenever  more  restrictions  are imposed,  and
0 otherwise.  The  variable  political news takes the  value  1 whenever  there  are events that  generate
political  stability,  -1 in the  opposite  cases,  and  0 otherwise.9
The literature  on herding  behavior  of investors  and  contagion  effects stresses  that  sometimes
investors  just  follow the  market  in  the  belief  that  market  indices  might  embody  relevant  infor-
mation,  without  using  resources  to  uncover the  behavior  of market  fundamentals  in the  different
1980s axe unrelated  to  the arrival of news.  These findings are not new, in fact, many studies of asset
pricing have rejected the view that new information is the driving force behind asset price movements. For
example,  Roll (1988) shows that  economic news releases explain  at  most  one-third  of the  monthly  variation
in individual  stock  returns.
9  Note that  "political stability"  may have different meanings  in different episodes.  For instance,  the illness
of President  Suharto  provokes instability  when it is unclear  who the  successor is going to be  and  the type  of
policies that  a future  government  is going to implement.  In contrast,  President  Suharto's  announcement  that
he is going to resign  brings  stability  because,  at  that  time,  this  change  in government  means that  Indonesia
can avoid disaster.- 12 -
countries.  In  these  circumstances,  we could  observe  the  stock  market  in one  country  collapsing
just  because  the stock  market  in another  country  collapses, with  no particular  information  release
justifying  that  move.  Thus,  market  jitters  on  those  days  with  "no news"  may  reflect precisely
those  herd instincts  of the  market  itselfl.  To capture  the possible  "herding"  behavior,  we create  a
dummy  variable  that  equals  1 when  the  analysis  in the  financial press  indicates  that  there  are no
apparent  news releases  and  zero otherwise.  Later  on, we also examine whether  investors  "moods"
spread  across national  borders,  that  is, whether  herding  behavior  is contagious,  or they  are con-
tained  within the  domestic  frontier.  To do so, we classify the days with  no news into days with  no
local news and  days with no  foreign news.  Days with  no local news are  the  days in which market
instabilities  start  in  the  local  economy.  If instead,  the  financial  headlines  indicate  that  market
rallies  or downturns  start  in  a neighbor  country,  we  classify those  days  as days with  no  foreign
news.
4.  What  nTiggers  Market  Jitters?
This section estimates  the  effect of the  different types  of news releases on the stock markets  of
the  nine  countries.1"  First,  the  section  examines  the  average response  of the  markets  to  different
types  of news.  It  also  examines  the  average  response  in  days  of no  news,  that  is,  the  average
response  when  some stock markets  move because  other  markets  (in the  same  or foreign country)
10  On most of the days with no news, the financial  press refers to investors' concerns about the domestic
economy although no economic news releases occur in those days.  This is why we interpret the swings in
those days as the product of herding behavior. However, market jitters in days of no news and concerns
about the economy could also suggest the presence of noise traders, with rallies or downturns completely
unrelated to market fundamentals. Moreover,  the fluctuations on those days may reflect investors' delayed
reaction to previous news, with investors taking several days to grasp the full effect of some of the economic
releases.  Also, market jitters in those days could also be a reaction to news only known by the so-called
"informed" investors. Still, the sheer magnitude of the reaction suggests that the actions of those informed
traders may have been imitated by a wider spectrum of investors -the herd. In all the cases, it is impossible
to isolate the cause triggering market jitters using just the information from press releases. With this caveat
in mind, we continue to identify days of no news with days of herding behavior.
11  See Baig and Goldfajn (1998) and Ganapolsky and Schmukler (1998) for an analysis of the effects of
international agreements and political announcements on financial  markets during the Asian and the Tequila
crises. See also Edison (1996) for another approach to studying financial market reactions to news.-13  -
move or just because of investors' concerns  'unexplained`b  the release of any information. We can
interpret this last response as the pure "herding" behavior effect. 12 That is, this response captures
the average reaction of investors when they follow  the market and do not take the time'and expense
to make their own assessment about the market fundamentals.
Second, this section also seeks to determine whether domestic developments  are at the source
of stock market volatility or whether information from other countries explains a large fraction of
stock price movements. That is, we study whether markets mostly move  in response to fluctuations
in domestic fundamentals or there are cross-country spillover effects. Since we classify the days
with no apparent news in days in which domestic markets follow  foreign markets and days in which
panics or euphorias are confined to one country, we can also examine whether herding behavior is
contagious.
Third, this section examines several claims of the theories of herding behavior and financial
contagion concerning the asymmetric response of investors to good and bad news in good and bad
times. For example, Rigobon (1998) indicates that  bad news becomes no news as the recession  in
the economy deepens. Also, Kodres and'Pritsker (1998) suggest that  in bad states, with collapses
in the banking sector, the asymmetries in information deepen, magnifying the contagion effect.
To examine whether news releases originating in different sectors of the  economy have dif-
ferent effects on the stock markets, we run regressions of price changes on the dummy variables
representing each of the announcements. Our regression is13
n
(1)  Rw  = ao  + ZEiD±  +,e,,
where  I  is the change in the  dollar value of the stock market  index  in country  j  (in percent)  from
12  In fact, herding behavior may be also reflected into an over-reaction or under-reaction to fundamental
news. This type  of herding  behavior  cannot  be  tested  in this  framework.  Over  or under-reactions can be
tested only in the context of a completely specified  model of the economy.
13  We run both pooled and  panel regressions. We only report the results from the pooled estimation
because the panel regression  results are similar and the fixed effects are not significantly  different from zero.- 14 -
the market closing in t -1  to the market closing  in t, and Dt is a dummy variable related to sector
i and reflecting the news releases after markets closing in t - 1 to the closing in t.  There are eight
dummy variables (n = 8), the first seven are related to the different "news," the last one D8 is
the "no news" dummy. The coefficients  of interest are the ai, which measure the impact of news
originating in different sectors and the average impact effect in days of no news.
The results are reported in Table 3, column 1.  With the exception of fiscal news, all other
information releases have significant impact effects on stock market returns.  In particular, news
related to agreements with international organizations and credit rating agencies are the ones with
larger effect on returns, with coefficients  indicating that, on average, stock prices change between
10 and  11 percent in the days with these type of news releases.  Interestingly, and  in contrast
to the claim that  IMF programs add to the panic and to the virulence of the financial crisis, we
find that, on average, stock markets rally on the day agreements are announced. Not surprisingly,
changes in country ratings also add to the volatility of the markets, with stock markets downturns
averaging about 10 percent in days of credit downgrades. These dramatic effects are not surprising
because credit  downgrades can, in fact, create havoc in the economies by sharply reducing the
ability of a country to borrow in international markets and thus fueling a profound credit crunch,
a further deterioration  of the economy, and a collapse in the stock market.  This credit-crunch
effect has been recently examined by Radelet and  Sachs (1998), who stress that  when a credit
rating  agency downgrades sovereign debt of a country, all debt instruments  from that  country
might have to be downgraded accordingly because of the sovereign ceiling doctrine.  As a result,
commercial banks in the country that  turn out to be rated as sub-investment grade can no longer
issue internationally recognized  letters of credit for domestic exporters and importers, isolating the
country from international capital markets.
New information on political issues, capital controls, and the economy  has a somewhat smaller
effect, the coefficients  in these cases oscillate around 7.14 The effects of monetary policy are more
14  Only  the effect  of economic  news  is significantly  smaller  than the effect  of information  about interna--15  -
modest and averaging about 4 percent. Finally, on average, the days of no information releases are
days with market downturns. On average, market prices fall about 2-1/2 percent on those days.15
Next, we examine whether the origin of news or rumors matters.  We run the following  regres-
sion
n  - n-1
(2)  a=  o +  cEiDt  +  E  NaiDF't +INNQ8DFt8  +e
i=l  i=l
where DF is the news or rumors with a foreign source, with the first seven dummies capturing the
news and the last dummy (DF8) capturing foreign rumors or jitters  in foreign markets in days of
"no news." In (2), we test separately whether the effects of news releases or rumors with a foreign
origin have different effects  from those of domestic news or rumors. The test of whether the overall
effect of foreign news (rumors) is different from that of domestic news (rumors) is a test of whether
ON (INN)  is significantly  different from zero. As shown in Table 3, column 2, foreign  news releases
seem to have a smaller effect on stock prices. However,  this effect is not statistically different from
zero, suggesting that  there are important cross-country spillover effects during the Asian crisis.
Similarly,  rumors or concerns in one country trigger market jitters  of similar magnitudes both in
the domestic and foreign markets.
Herding behavior theories suggest that reactions to good news may be different from reactions
to bad news. To 'examine  this hypothesis, we have to classify  the news into "good" and "bad" news.
News indicating political stability, a stable economy,  the upgrade of credit ratings, and agreements
with international organizations are classified  as "good" news. News about expansionary fiscal or
monetary policy are also classified as good news and so are the removal of capital controls. We
tional agreements  and credit ratings.
15  To examine  whether  the results  just described  depend  on the particular  sample  selected,  we carry out
sensitivity  analysis  using  different  samples.  In particular,  we  estimate  equation  (1) using  only the top 10  and
the top 15 days of market  jitters. The results are quite robust, with the order of the effects  of the different
sources  of news  not being  affected  by the sample  selected,  that is agreements  with international  organizations
and credit  ratings  are the news  releases  that trigger  the largest  average  daily swings  in financial  markets  and
monetary  and fiscal  policies  the smallest. These  results are available  from the authors upon request.- 16  -
test this hypothesis by running the following  regression,
n  n-1
(3)  S  = ao +  aDl  +  ElaDG%t  +,E,3,
i=l  i=l-1
where DG is a release of good news and n = 8.  Again, the test of whether the overall effect of
good news is different from that of bad news is a test of whether j3 is significantly different from
zero. As shown in column 3, good news seems to have a smaller effect on stock markets providing
some support for Kodres and Pritsker  conclusion that  bad news and financial crises accentuate
informational asymmetries and generate more contagion and herding behavior.
The coefficients  in the above regressions  capture the average reaction of the market to informa-
tion releases. Sometimes, however,  good news may fail to lift investors spirits and markets continue
to collapse while bad news may still prompt a rally. The possibly changing sign of the response can
be particularly important when examining the response of financial markets to changes in mone-
tary and fiscal policies. For example, one of:  the most controversial issues during the Asian crisis
has been whether contractionary monetary policy can stabilize financial markets, as supported by
the International Monetary Fund, or send the economy into a tail spin with profound collapses in
output and financial markets, as suggested by Radelet and Sachs (1998) and Stiglitz (1998) among
others. In fact, as examined by Kindleberger (1978)
"Tight money in a  given financial center can serve either to  attract  funds or to  repel
them, depending on the expectations that  a rise in interest rates generates. With inelastic
expectations -no fear of crisis or of currency depreciation- an increase in the discount rate
attracts funds from abroad, and helps to provide the cash needed to ensure liquidity; with
elastic expectations of change.  -of falling prices, bankruptcies, or exchange depreciations-
raising the discount rate may suggest to foreigners  the need to take more funds out rather
than bring new funds in."
The effects of fiscal policy have also been at the center of the policy debate during the Asian
crisis, with  many emphasizing the stabilizing role of contractionary fiscal policy and  as many- 17 -
supporting  the  opposite  view.  For example,  at  the  onset  of thb crisis,  the  IMF  demands  that  the
affected  countries  run  a  fiscal surplus  of 1 percent  of GDP  so  as to  avoid a  further  collapse  of
their  economies.  In contrast,  Radelet  and  Sachs  (1998) argue that  fiscal targets  simply  add  to the
contractionary  force of the  crisis.
To examine  whether  the  behavior  of financial  markets  during  the  Asian  crisis supports  one
or the two sides in this  policy debate,  we estimate  our baseline  regression,  shown  in equation  (1),
but  this  time  using  the  absolute  values of the  stock  market  changes  and  the  absolute  values of
the  news variables.  This  methodology  allows us  to  relate  the  swings  in the  stock  market  to  the
different  news regardless  of the  sign of the  relationship.  Interestingly,  once we ignore the  sign of
the  relationship  between  the  news  and the  stock market  swings, we find that  fiscal and  monetary
policies do have profound  impacts  on the  stock  market,  with  stock  market  swings  (downturns  or
rallies)  almost  reaching  9 percent  in those  days.  Moreover, these  average effects are substantially
larger  than  those  estimated  in  column  (1).16 The  results  indicate  that  sometimes  news  releases
about  contractionary  fiscal  and  monetary  policies  trigger  dramatic  rallies  in  financial  markets
but  they  cause  striking  downturns  in other  episodes.  We should  also note,  that,  overall,  all  the
coefficients in  this  regression  are  larger  than  those  in  column  (1)  suggesting  that,  for example,
sometimes  agreements  with  international  organizations  or the  elimination  of capital  controls  fail
to  restore  investors'  confidence.  Still,  with  the  exception  of monetary  and  fiscal  policies,  the
coefficients  of the  other  news  in  column  4 are  not  significantly  different  from  those  in  column
1.  Finally,  the  regression  in  absolute  values  allows us  to  capture  a  better  measure  of volatility
in financial  markets  in days  of no  news.  Now, the  coefficient  of the  "no news"  dummy  variable,
a8,  measures  the  average  daily  swings in  days of  "no news,"  regardless  of the  sign.  In  contrast,
in  column  (1),  the  coefficient  a8  measures  average  returns  in those  same  days,  but  in  this  case
downturns  are  offset by  market  rallies  with  this  coefficient becoming  substantially  smaller.  Once
16  Still, these responses are statistically smaller than the response of financial  markets to either interna-
tional agreements or credit ratings news.-18  -
we focus on the mean of the swings in absolute values, we find that  markets are about as volatile
in days of no news as in days of relevant economic  information, 7.1 versus 6.88 percent, suggesting
the presence of important herding behavior and contagion effects.
As we discussed in the introduction, frictions in information may lead to herding behavior
with signals having a different information content over the crisis cycle. Moreover, investors may
react differently to  "good" and  "bad" news as the crisis progresses. To examine this hypothesis,
we need to allow for the possibility of time-varying coefficients,  that is, we need to estimate rolling
regressions as follows,
n  n
(4)  14 a  =O  +  E  'tDG%t  +  E,tiDBt  +  l,'
i=l  i=l
where DG is good news and DB is bad news. 17 Since for some of the news, such as news  concerning
fiscal policy, there are not enough releases to allow us to estimate time-varying coefficients,  we only
estimate time-varying regressions for four types of news, that  is n is equal to four. The results are
reported in Figure 3, where we plot the time-varying coefficients  for the different dummy variables.
Note that,  the response to good news about international agreements seems somewhat larger after
international banks agree to rollover Korea's short-term debt in January  1998. In contrast,  the
daily swings in financial markets in days of no news become more pronounced as the crisis deepens,
with moody investors driving prices down still further even in the absence of any fundamental news.
While the results suggest a somewhat changing reaction to news and in days of "no news" as the
crisis progresses, the estimates do not provide a strong overall evidence favoring  the hypothesis of
changing informational content of news over the course of a crisis.
5.  Are  Market  Jitters  Persistent?
While  we focus on  the  days of extreme  market  jitters,  these  days  may  just  capture  one-day
episodes  that  do  not  have  long  sustained  large  effects on  financial  markets.  To study  whether
17  Note that  now, the dummy variables DGJ (DBi)  take the value 1 when there are  "good" ("bad")
news releases and zero otherwise. Also, since  the "no news" dummy cannot be decomposed  into "good" and
"bad," we can just  estimate one coefficient.  That is, for that dummy variable at  =  3.- 19 -
market  jitters  imply  a persistent  change in the mood of investors,  we rely on event-study  methods
commonly used in the  finance literature.
The main  question  we ask is whether  the  behavior  of the stock  market  following these  events
is sufficiently different  from  its behavior  in the  days  leading up  to  the  event.  To do  so, we need
to  define  normnal returns  (p,  where  r  denotes  the  date  of the  event),  which  reflect  the  typical
behavior  of the stock market  in the days before each event.1 8 In practice,  we estimate  the  normal
return  by computing  the  mean  daily  return  over the  ten business  days that  preceded  each event
10
(5)  IT  =  ER 7 _j/1o.
j=1
Once  we  obtain  the  estimates  of normal  returns  for  each event,  we  compute  abnormal  returns,
Rt  - r for t =  T-10,.  ..,  r + 10. Each study uses a 21-day window,  which includes ten days before
and  ten  days after the  event.19
Figure  4 summarizes  the event-study  results in some detail.  The four plots show the cumulative
abnormal  returns  over that  window for,all stock  markets  around  the  time  of large  one-day market
rallies  or  downturns.  The  events  are  divided  between  those  days  with  news  and  days  with  no
apparent  sources  of new  information.  The  top  figures are the  events  related  to  no news releases.
The  left figures are the  events with  positive  market  jitters.  Day zero is the  day of market  jitters.
The  results  suggest  an  asymmetric  response  of financial  markets  after  the  one-day  largest
market  rallies  and  downturns.  In  particular,  according  to  this  event  study  analysis,  large  daily
market  rallies tend  to be sustained  while market  downturns  are usually reversed within the following
10 days.  Typically,  after experiencing  a large  gain, the  stock market  rally continues.  For example,
18  Sometimes  in the financial literature, the typical event study uses a broader market index return as a
proxy for normal returns.  This is because those event studies focus on the possible abnormal returns in a
particular industry and control for the state of the economy using a broader market index. This is not the
purpose of our analysis. Instead, we want to examine whether different news releases have a lasting impact
on financial markets relative to their behavior before that  particular piece of news.
19  Sometimes  the days of market jitters in each country are separated by less than 21 days. In these cases,
we estimate  the event  studies  using  the overlapping  events  too.-20  -
cumulative  abnormal  returns  are  about  15 percentage  points  at  day  10.  Although  differences  do
not  appear  substantial,  in  the  short  run,  cumulative  abnormal. returns  seem  to  increase  more  in
the  case  of positive  movements  with  news,  relative  to  the  no-news  episodes.  A  different  picture
emerges from the  analysis  of large  daily  downturns.  On  average,  after  experiencing  a  correction,
markets  recover,  with  the  recovery  being  somewhat  faster  for  those  events  with  no  news.  The
pattern  during  market  rallies  is consistent  with  investors  following momentum  trading,  buying
previous  winners.  This  is not  the  case  in  market  downturns,  when  investors  do  not  seem  to  be
selling previous  losers, and  in fact  may be  buying  in the  deeps.
Figure  4 also examines  whether  the  type  of news or the  country  of origin  of the  news affects
the  degree  of persistence  of market  jitters.  We classify  positive  (negative)  shocks  as persistent
when the  cumulative  abnormal  returns  are still  positive  (negative)  ten  days after the  day with  the
large shock.  The tables  at  the  bottom  of Figure  4 show that  the origin of news does not basically
affect  the  degree  of persistence  of the  shocks  in  the  stock  market.  Basically  all  positive  shocks
are  persistent  while  negative  shocks  are  of a  more  mean-reverting  nature.  With  respect  to  the
country  of origin of the  news, bad  news releases  originated  in Korea  and  Taiwan  have somewhat
more persistent  effects that  bad  news originated  in other  countries.
6.  Conclusions
The  abruptness  and  virulence  of the  1997-98 Asian  crisis  have  resurrected  once  again  the
debate  about  the causes of crises.  There  are many that  support  the view that  deteriorating  market
fundamentals  are  at  the  core of the  crisis.  Others  have  suggested  self-fulfilling crises  or investors'
herding  behavior.  This  paper  does  not  attempt  to  inquire  into  the  origin  and  the  extent  of the
Asian  crisis.  Its  goal is more  limited,  it only examines  the  sources  of the  largest  daily  swings  in
financial  markets.  While  the  goal  is more  limited  than  a  general  inquiry  into  the  causes  of the
Asian  meltdown,  it  is nonetheless  quite  relevant  in  view of the  chaotic  financial  environment  of
East  Asia  in  1997-1998, where  daily  changes  in  stock  prices  of as  much  as  10  percent  become-21  -
commonplace. This paper examines the events that  trigger those market jitters  and proposes a
methodology for capturing herding behavior and contagion effects using high frequency data.  The
analysis is concentrated in the twenty largest one-day swings in stock prices (in dollars) in nine
Asian countries from January  1997  to May 1998 (a total of one hundred eighty daily changes).
Our main results indicate that  some of the largest one-day swings cannot be explained by
any apparent substantial news, economic or political, but  seem to be driven by herd instincts of
the market itself. Interestingly, our results also indicate that  rumors or concerns unrelated to the
release of relevant information affect foreign markets as strongly as they affect domestic financial
markets, suggesting the presence of important contagion effects. Moreover, as the crisis deepens,
daily reactions in the absence of relevant news become more pronounced perhaps indicating an
increase in uncertainty and asymmetries in information, which can magnify the contagion effect,
as in Kodres and Pristker (1998). When news releases do matter, the ones that have more weight
on financial markets are those releases about agreements with the international community and
credit  rating agencies.  News releases about monetary and fiscal policies are also at the center
of the daily instabilities.  In fact, over several episodes, tight policies contribute to rallies but  in
others they steer the market into deep downturns. Interestingly, there is also some evidence that
investors, overall, react instantaneously more strongly to bad news compared to their  reactions
to good news. Again, we could argue that  bad news in crisis episodes may increase uncertainty,
accentuating herding behavior.
While the instantaneous reactions to bad  news are stronger than  those to  good news, our
event-study analysis indicates that  the one-day market rallies are sustained and trend-changing
while news or rumors that  trigger market  panics do not  have persistent  effects.  These results
suggest a recurring pattern  of asymmetric response of investors to  "good" and  "bad" news that
should be explained by the different theories of herding behavior and contagion in particular, and
more in general by theories of investors behavior. Interestingly, the pattern  during market rallies
is consistent with investors following momentum trading,  buying previous winners.  This is not- 22 -
the case in market downturns, when investors do not seem to  be selling previous losers. All our
results come from observations in  "crisis" times.  One issue that  would be interesting to examine
is the reaction of markets to news in "good" times. This type of evidence  would allow us to make
progress in our understanding of the way investors acquire new information about the state of the
economy and also about their investment-trading strategies.- 23 -
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Stock Market Retums in U.S.  Dollars
(in Percent)
Summary Statistics
Janu  ary 1. 1990 -December  31.1996  _  January 1. 1997  - Mav 25. 1998
All Davs  Days  of Market  Jitters
Standard  Standard  Ma  Standard
Count_v  Mean  Deviation  Minimum  Maximum  Mean  Deviation  Minimum  Maximum  Mean  Deviation
Hong Kong  0.10  1.36  -8.45  5.86  -0.08  2.54  -13.69  18.84  -0.99  8.15
Indonesia  0.03  0.86  -4.81  3.25  -0.53  4.87  -17.03  28.67  -2.89  15.28
Japan  -0.01  1.43  -7.50  11.01  -0.09  1.51  -5.53  6.82  -0.13  4.02
Korea  -0.02  1.45  -8.09  8.71  -0.32  4.02  -19.16  20.47  -0.80  12.89
Malaysla  0.06  1.23  -7.34  9.92  -0.40  3.44  -12.75  16.09  1.67  10.49
Philippines  0.09  1.48  -6.03  9.19  -0.24  2.65  -9.96  14.22  0.35  7.76
Singapore  0.03  0.94  -6.31  4.97  -0.19  1.82  -8.92  10.27  -1.00  5.74
Taiwan  0.03  2.09  -9.79  10.53  0.01  1.71  -9.50  5.14  -1.92  4.27
Thailand  0.01  1.65  -8.57  8.96  -0.27  3.44  -13.38  18.35  3.31  9.46
Average  1  0.04  1.39  -7.43  8.05  I  -0.23  2.89  -12.21  15.43  1  -0.27  8.67Table  2
Origins  of Market  Turbulence
Country of Origin
Number  of News Originating  in:
Market  Domestic  Foreign
Jitters In:  Hong Kong  Indonesia  Japan  Korea  Malaysia Philippines  Singapore  Taiwan.  Thailand  USA  China  Economy  Economy
Hong  Kong  13  0  2  2  0  0  0  0  0  1  2  13  7
Indonesia  0  19  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  1  0  19  1
Japan  0  0  20  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  20  0
Korea  0  1  0  18  1  0  0  0  0  0  0  18  2
Malaysia  0  6  0  0  13  0  0  0  0  1  0  13  7
Philippines  0  1  0  0  1  15  0  0  0  3  0  15  5
Slngapore*  1  7  0  0  3  1  7  0  0  3  0  7  15
Taiwan  1  0  1  1  0  0  0  13  0  4  0  13  7
Thailand  0  2  1  0  0  0  0  0  16  1  0  16  4
Total  15  36  24  21  18  16  7  13  16  14  2  134  48
Sho number  tor Singapore  adds  to more  than  twenty  sinc one  of its market  jitters  is attibuted  to news  from  three  countres.
._______  Sector of Origin
Number  of News  of Type:
Market  Political  Economic  Capital  Fiscal  Monetary  Intrnational  Credit  No
Jitters in:  News  News  Controls  Policy  Policy  Agreements  Ratings  News
Hong  Kong  2  1  0  1  1  1  1  13
Indonesia  8  2  0  2  1  4  0  3
Japan  4  7  0  1  1  1  0  6
Korea  1  3  0  0  2  7  4  3
Malaysia  3  3  2  1  1  5  1  4
Philippines  2  1  0  0  4  0  0  13
Singapore  4  3  1  0  1  3  0  8
Taiwan  5  7  2  0  1  0  0  5
Thailand  4  2  2  2  0  2  1  7
Total  33  29  7  7  12  23  7  62Table 3
Regression  Analysis
Dependent  Vaniables
Percent  Change  in  Percent  Change  in  Percent  Change  in  Absolute  Percent
Stock  Market  Stock  Market  Stock  Market  Change  in Stock
Prices  Prices  Prices  Market  Prices
Explanatory
Variables  OLS  Non-Linear  Least  Squares  OLS
Constant  -0.45  -0.52  2.69
(-0.64)  (-.74)  (1.07)
Political  News  7.53  8.09  **  11.62  **  8.17
(6.40)  (6.22)  (3.68)  (7.9)
Economic  News  6.07 **  6.24  9.22*  .6.88
(4.56)  (4.50)  (3.25)  (9.12)
Capital  Controls  7.29  7.62  10.55  *  9.82
(2.70)  (2.73)  (1.88J  (5.45)
Fiscal  Policy  0.76  -0.16  0.71  8.83
(0.03)  (-.054)  (0.19)  (7.20)
Monetary  Policy  3.90  3.94  6.34 *  8.26
(1.92)  (1.83)  (1.88).  (7.51)
International  9.63**  10.49***  13.25***-10.75**
Agreements  (6.51)  (5.97)  (3.67):  0  (12.26)
Credit  Ratings  10.67  11.08  ***  13.95  10.99:***
(3.95)  (3.97)  (3.66)  (5.39)
No News  -2.44  -2.09  *  -5.58 *  -7.10
(-2.15)  (-1.66)  (-2.09)  (16.83)
Differential  Effect  of  -0.61  *
Good  News  (-1.94)
Differential  Effect  of  -0.22
Foreign  News  (-1.22)
Differential  Effect  of  0.48
No News  and  Foreign  (0.43)
Number  of
Observations  180  180  180  180
Adjusted  R-Squared  0.42  0.42  0.43  0.45
L-M  Test  for
Heteroskedasticity  2.09  0.91  2.50  3.89
Notes:  ,  ,  and  * indicates  statistical  significance  of  1,  5,  and  10  percent  respectively.
T-statistics  in  parentheses
1.  Robust  standard  errors  are  used,  since  the  L-M  test  suggests  the  presence  of  heteroskedasticity.Figure  1
Stock  Market Indices  in U.S. Dollars and Days of Stock Market Jitters
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Time-Varying Effect of News  on Stock Markets
No News  Intemational Agreements
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Note:  These  plots  report  the  evolution  of the  coefficient  W  and ' in equation  (4):
n  n
R  = a ° +  Ea'DG  ' + E8'DB  + sJ
Confidence  bands  represent  +/-  one  standard  error.
DG  (DB)  takes  value  of I if there  is ugood 0 news  ('bad" news)  and  zero  otherwise.
For  each  series,  the  initial  values  of both  coefficients  were  estimated  using  a sample  composed  of the  first  20
observations.  Each  subsequent  values  were  estimated  by  adding  one  observation  to the  sample  until  all
observations  were  included.Figure 4
Market Jitters: Event-Study  Analysis
Cumulative Abnormal Returns in Days of Market  Rallies  Cumulative Abnormal Returns In Days of Market Downturns
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Proportion of Days  with Persistent Market  Jitters
Market  Market  Market  Market
News of Type:  Rallies  Downtums  News Originating In:  Rallies  Downturns
Political  News  0.61  0.20  Hong  Kong  1.00  0.33
Economic  News  1.00  0.57  Indonesia  0.83  0.21
Capital Controls  0.80  0.50  Japan  0.63  0.42
Fiscal  Policy  1.00  0.50  Korea  0.56  0.82
Monetary  Policy  1.00  0.67  Malaysia  0.67  0.36
Intemational  Agreements  0.79  0.33  Philippines  0.80  0.40
Credit Ratings  0  0.50  Singapore  1.00  0.33
No News  0.68  0.37  Taiwan  0.83  0.50
._______________________________  Thailand  0.67  0.38
Solid  line  is the  mean  of  cumulative  aggregate  retums  (CAR)  in percent.
Dashed  lines are +/- one standard deviation  from the mean.
Persistent  positive (negative)  movements  are defined as movements  with  CARs that remain postive  (negative) on day 10.Appendix  Table
Daily  Returns  (in Percent)  and News  in Days  of Market  Jifters
I  Date  |HK  I  Indonesia  I  Japan  I  Korea  I Malaysia I  Philippines  Singapore I Taiwan  I  Thailand  | News in Bloomberg
119/97  -1.89  -0.77  -2.81  2.68  0.03  0.44  0.10  -0.13  1.22  Bad loans may hobble economic  growth.  (Japan, NN, 1)
3121/97  0.12  -1.10  N/A  -2.49  -1.19  -0.17  -1.52  -3.19  -0.28  Govt. suspends pork exports due to epidemic. (Taiwan, EN,
3124197  2.06  -0.90  -1.07  -2.00  0.14  0.64  1.09  -3.82  1.70  Farm losses will hurt economic growth. (Taiwan, EN, -1)
5/5/97  2.41  1.05  N/A  N/A  -0.15  4.93  0.99  0.79  N/A  Inflation falls to 4.6. (Philippines, EN, 1)
5112/97  0.42  0.38  3.53  -2.13  -1.96  N/A  1.58  -3.56  -1.85  JPN: No news. (Japan, NN, 1)
TAI: Foreign investors move $1.1  bn out on news of
resignations  of senior govt. officials. (Taiwan, PN, -1)
5114197  1.80  -0.89  1.15  N/A  -1.48  1.10  -0.22  2.87  -6.93  Baht drops amid concem about political stability. (Thailand,
_ _ _ _ _ _ _  _ _ _ _ _  _ _  _ _ _ _ _  _ _ _ _ _ _  _ _ _ _ _ _  _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _  _ _ _ _ _ _ _  _ _ ___  N  N  , 1)
6116197  1.98  0.93  1.09  -0.06  -0.21  -0.37  -0.01  3.77  0.38  Higher profits in semiconductor makers and local property
market is reviving. (Taiwan,  EN, 1)
6119197  2.11  -0.48  -0.15  -0.28  0.78  3.56  0.68  -0.93  -10.78  Finance Minister Viravan resigns. (Thailand, PN, -1)
6123197  -0.93  1.05  -0.71  -2.24  -0.74  -2.52  0.63  0.56  7.32  New finance minister to announce measures to boost the
I___  _  _  _  _  _  _  finance industry. (Thailand, PN, 1)
7/4197  -1.55  0.25  0.28  0.82  -0.84  0.56  0.59  1.86  6.99  Devaluation of the baht will revive economy. (Thailand, NN,
7/11/97  2.52  -1.52  -0.20  -0.08  0.34  -3.75  0.16  -0.51  -7.49  Thai baht  tumbles as regional  currency concems widens.
(Thailand,  NN, 1)
8111/97  -1.13  -3.21  -1.74  1.79  -6.45  -3.06  -4.21  -0.23  -2.59  Japanese trade surplus with the US widens. (USA, EN, -1)
8/22/97  -1.46  -3.75  -1.72  -0.49  -0.50  -1.06  0.02  -0.05  -7.47  Central bank discloses that net foreign reserves  fell 25 in 9
months to defend baht. (Thailand, EN, -1)
8125197  1.10  -7.17  -1.94  0.16  -2.53  -2.88  0.50  -0.10  -7.59  Standard  & Poor may cut ratings for Thailand sovereign
I___ _ _ _ _ _  debt. (Thailand,  CR, -1)
8128/97  -4.31  -7.75  -0.32  -1.73  -6.54  -9.50  -4.60  -2.11  -2.76  PHI, SNG:  lighter  credit as reserve requirements  rise.
_  ______  ______  _______  (Malaysia,  MP, -1)
8129197  -5.15  -7.37  -1.45  -1.80  -1.24  -2.95  -0.98  N/A  -2.32  Local interest rates surge. (Hong Kong, NN, 1)
911/97  -5.18  -0.60  -2.98  -3.46  N/A  -2.68  -2.82  N/A  -2.12  HK: Higher interest rates may erode corporate profits. (Hong
Kong, NN, 1)
JPN: Concem about Asian turmoil raises concem that
Japanese economy is not improving  (Japan, NN, 1)
913/97  6.90  7.02  3.01  0.00  -7.81  -2.21  0.36  2.66  -1.69  HK, JPN: Japanese finance minister announces that Japan
will not try to weaken the dollar. (Japan, PN, 1)
MAL: Trading restrictions have been imposed.  (Malaysia,
._____  _______  ______  ._____  ___  _  _  _  CC,  -1)
9/4J97  -3.59  4.15  0.16  -0.33  -4.25  2.06  0.05  -3.37  -0.97  Doubt whether island's stock market would be able to
______  ________  ________  __________  ________  withstand  slide  in regional  equity  markets.  (Taiwan,  NN,  1)
9/5/97  2.56  13.29  -0.36  1.75  14.92  1.60  3.99  1.55  5.82  IND: Rupiah strong despite cut in interest rates. (Indonesia,
MP, 1)
MAL: Curbs on trading end and large public projects are
shelved. (Malaysia, CC/FP, 1/1)
SNG: Malaysia takes steps to liberalize  their equity markets.
(Malaysia,  CC, 1)Date  |HK  Indonesia  I  Japan  Korea  Malaysia  I  Philippines  Singapore  Taiwan  Thailand  TNews  in Bloomberg
918197  1.65  2.58  -0.09  -0.44  7.45  0.03  2.85  -1.52  8.05  MAL: 3 major public works projects are delayed. (Malaysia,
FP, -1)
THA: Deregulation package (including cuts in govt.
spending), will help bring down interest rates and shore up
the rupiah. (Indonesia, FP, -1)
919197  1.30  -0.30  2.04  -1.42  1.57  9.04  2.49  -0.76  0.34  Central Bank able to buy dollars in spot markets-pressure
I______  ___  ___  _  ______  ___  ____  ___  ___  _  _____  _______  on the peso may be easing. (Philippines, NN, 1)
9/12/97  1.11  -1.79  .2.74  0.58  1.58  0.40  0.06  0.44  -4.73  Govt. says that economy posts its biggest contraction in the
April-June period. (Japan, EN, -1)
9/18/97  N/A  0.10  0.30  N/A  -2.73  -5.95  -0.63  0.59  2.21  Currency  falls amid concern  that loan defaults and political
tension could cause an outflow of investment. (Philippines,
_  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _ _ __  _ _ _ _ _ _ _  _ _ _ _ _  ______  N  N  , 1)
9/19197  -0.25  0.92  -0.35  -2.23  -0.42  5.15  -0.05  1.15.  0.04  Central bank lowers rates for reserve repurchase
_________  _________  ____  __  _  _______  ________  instruments. (Philippines,  MP, 1)
10/8/97  0.17  2.06  1.04  -3.19  7.54  0.78  0.18  0.45  -1.04  Finance Minister says that the budget would restore the
'economy's  heaKth.  (Malaysia,  PN, 1)
1019/97  -3.87  2.92  -1.04  -0.17  3.50  7.05  0.34  2.48  -1.03  Borrowing costs come down as the central bank cuts the
ovemight  borrowing rate. (Philippines,  MP, 1)
10116197  1.37  -2.84  2.49  -4.37  -0.63  -0.49  -1.40  -3.39  -1.70  Compaq,  Sears Roebuck, and Merck announces
disappointing eamings. (USA, EN, -1)
10/17197  0.22  3.13  -0.34  1.07  -3.70  -0.19  0.24  ,5.48  -0.99  Market shares ind eamings of Taiwanese computer
companies in the US fall. (Taiwan, EN, -1)
10/20/97  -4.78  4.31  -2.51  4.44  -4.95  -1.39  -2.73  -9.98  -6.19  HK: Stocks fell as banks raised mortgage lending rates.
(Hong Kong, NN, 1)
TAI: Central Bank says that it would let market forces
______  ________  determine  the Taiwan dollar rate. (Taiwan, CC, 1)
10/21/97  -4.58  0.98  0.09  0.15  -1.45  -1.85  -1.87  5.01  -0.70  Govt. unveils a series of measures to bolster stocks by
cutting the minimum  deposit needed to buy shares and
raised the deposit required  to bet against them. (Taiwan,
_____  _____  ____  _____  ______  _____  ____  _____  ~~CC,  1)
10/22/97  -6.37  -3.48  1.35  6.91  -5.57  -4.67  -3.30  0.79  -2.89  Rising interest rates and calls to abandon the currency peg
_ends  stocks tumbling. (Hong Kong, NN, 1)
10/23/97  -10.73  0.32  -2.08  -0.19  -2.67  -2.33  -3.55  1.65  N/A  HK: Chief executive says that interest rates may have to go
up to defend  currency. (HK, PN, -1)
SNG: Report by SBC  Warburg says that Singapore's GDP
growth to slow to 2-down  from the 6 projected earlier.
(Singapore, EN, -1)
10/24197  6.72  0.99  -0.35  -6.53  -2.46  -3.26  -1.36  -1.81  N/A  Interest rates fall allaying concem that the peg to the US
I___  _______would  break. (Hong Kong, NN, 1)
10/27/97  -6.08  -1.04  -1.74  -8.45  0.98  0.22  0.71  -1.21  -0.22  Concern that rising interest rates may erode corporate
profits. (Hong Kong, NN, 1)
10/28197  -14.72  -10.74  -2.52  -8.73  -9.06  -6.22  -7.23  -7.03  -7.58  Worst plunge in US stocks since the 1987 crash. US stocks
crashed  on concem that Asian economies were slowing
down. (USA, NN, 1)
SNG: Stocks plunge following crash in Hong Kong. (Hong
Kong, NN, 1)
10129/97  17.26  5.11  3.11  1.58  3.22  5.22  3.40  -1.80  -2.24  Markets surge as US stocks soared in the busiest day ever.
(USA, NN, 1)|Date  IHK  I  Indonesia  I Japan  Korea  I Malaysia I  Philippines  I  Singapore I  Taiwan  Thailand  News in Bloomberg
11/3197  5.76  9.53  N/A  7.76  12.18  1.02  7.35  N/A  0.97  HK: China eases credit. (China, MP, 1)
MAL: Ringgit soars along wfth the rupiah after bank reforms
in Indonesia.  (Indonesia, EN, 1)
SNG: Stocks soar in the wake of IMF rescue package for
.. ______  _Indonesia.  (Indonesia, IA,  1)
1114197  -4.31  -0.16  N/A  6.73  0.82  4.09  0.50  3.46  10.83  TAI: Stocks rally after surge in DOW. (USA, NN, 1)
THA: PM may quit paving  the way for a new govt. (Thailand,
___  _  _  _  _ _  _  _  _  _ _  _  _  _  _  _ _  _  _  _  _  _  _ _ _ _ _  _ _ _ _  PN  , 1)
11/7/97  -2.98  -3.78  -3.46  -7.66  -3.43  0.10  -1.05  -3.S4  8.64  JPN: Bank of Yokohama to liquidate its entire equity
portfolio. Concem about banks exposure  to bankruptcies
(Japan, EN, -1)
TAI: Stocks drop on concem that currency may weaken if
Korean Won continues to depreciate (Korea, NN, 1)
THA: News that Democrat  party leader Chuan Leekpai may
______  _  _____  _  _____  _  _______  ______I  be next Prime Minister. (Thailand,  PN, 1)
11M7/97  4.54  -0.87  6.60  -6.75  -1.97  2.08  1.37  2.35  -5.40  Premier hints that public spending  may be used to stimulate
the economy.  (Japan, PN, 1)
11/18U97  -1.69  -0.75  1.20  -0.88  -9.24  -3.19  -0.52  -1.87  -0.90  Unted Engineers bails out parent company. Stocks fall on
I  ~~~~~~~~~~~~concem  that regulatory  environment is lax. (Malaysia, EN, 1)
11/19197  -0.90  -5.18  -5.68  -0.63  -4.55  0.32  -1.71  -2.14  -1.82  Govt. issues confusing signals about propping up  the
I________  ________  _______  ________  ________  __________  ________  financial sector. (Japan, EN, -1)
11/20/97  -096  -6.55  2.02  -12.39  -13.64  -0.05  -0.75  -0.19  -3.10  KOR: Govt. widens trading band to shore up financial
sector. (Korea, MP, 1)
MAL: Stock plunges on concem of more corporate bailouts
_~~~~~~~~~~~~~~  of troubled companies by cash rich units. (Malaysia, NN, 1)
11121197  4.83  -2.49  3.58  11.40  6.87  -0.29  1.51  1.96  0.87  HK, KOR: Govt. seems poised to tum to the IMF to contain
the financial crisis. Stocks rise. (Korea, IA, 1)
JPN: ruling party moves towards using public funds to shore
up Japan's financial system. (Japan, EN, 1)
______  _______  _________  ________  MAL: Strong ringgit boosts stocks. (Malaysia, NN, 1)
11)24197  0.30  3.97  - N/A  -14.40  0.64  -0.93  2.57  2.94  -2.00  IMF imposes tax raises and spending cuts as part of bailout.
.______  _______  _______  _________  ________  Growth may slow down. (Korea, IA, 11)
11126197  -2.48  -4.15  N/A  -6.03  -5.65  -2.60  -1.56  -3.34  -4.67  Uncertainty  exists about whether ruling party KMT would win
the county polls. (Taiwan, PN, -1)
11128/97  -0.53  N/A  0.05  -9.41  -1.73  0.17  -0.36  -0.24  -2.49  Korean stocks tumble on concems of slowing economic
growth. (Korea, NN, 1)
12V1/97  2.09  N/A  0.43  -6.14  -4.44  -0.29  -0.11  -4.71  -4.22  Ruling KMT loses majority in local govt. elections casting
I______________  _  _____  ______  ______  _________  ___doubts  over Rs  future. (Taiwan, PN, -1)
12VV97  4.17  -4.25  0.37  -7.95  0.59  -0.02  0.94  3.42  -1.54  Japanese PM said that he would do anything necessary to
safeguard  the financial system. (Japan, PN, 1)
12J4197  2.37  2.70  -2.31  8.74  3.46  0.94  0.82  2.85  2.84  Govt. promises  to increase access to financial markets in
I______  ____________  _____  ______  ___return  for $55bn IMF bailout. (Korea, IA,  1)
12i8197  1.68  -0.99  -2.21  -13.37  11.58  3.19  1.88  2.37  N/A  KOR: Short term foreign  debt is far higher than earlier
announced; lack of funds may cause financial companies to
shut down. (Korea, EN, -1)
MAL: Govt. announces measures to avoid asking the IMF
.________  for  help. (Malaysia, IA,  -1)Date  |HK  I Indonesia I  Japan  I Korea  Malaysia  I  Philippines  Singapore Tawan  Thaland  News  In Bloomberg
1219197  -2.04  -9.81  2.95  -15.08  -6.57  1.18  -2.04  -1.02  -5.06 JPN:  PM  Hashimoto  favors  spending  $77bn  in govt.  money
to help  banks  and  other  financial  institutions  write  off bad
loan.  (Japan,  PN,  1)
KOR:  Govt.  suspends  5 cash  strapped  companies.  (Korea,
EN, -1)
12/11197  -5.68  -5.78  -2.76  -14.68  -10.21  -8.80  -3.28  -1.75  N/A JPN:  Investors  are  concemed  that ruling  party  will not  be
able  to deliver  a proposal  to stabilize  the  financial  system
and  boost  the  economy  with publicly  financed  bonds.
(Japan,  NN,  1)
KOR:  Moody  cuts  rating  of South  Korean  foreign  currency
bonds  to Baa2.  (Korea,  CR,  -1)
MAL:  High  interest  rates  and  weakening  currency  cause
stocks  to drop.  (Malaysia,  MP,  -1)
PHI:  Poor  economic  outlook  in Philippines.  (Philippines,  NN,
12/12197  1.84  -18.67  -2.47  -7.49  -3.43  -3.30  -1.65  0.22  -5.64 Suharto  may  have  serious  health  problems.  (Indonesia,  PN,
-1)
12115197  -1.71  -18.59  -2.25  18.62  -5.94  -5.70  -4.32  -3.19  -5.18  IND,  Philippines:  Possible  freeze  on loan  repayments;
Suharto's  health  fails.  (Indonesia,  FS/PN,  -1/-1)
KOR:  Hopes  of accelerated  assistance  from  the  IMF.
(Korea,  IA, 1)
SNG:  Technology  stocks  fall - mirrors  Wall  Street  decline
amid  concems  on  Asian  turmoil.  (USA,  NN,  1)
TAI:  Interest  rates  raised  to support  currency  as currency
declines  in response  to  currency  decdines  in the  rest  of  Asia.
Traders  bet  that  computer  technology  companies  will have
:_______ _____  _____  ____slow sales. (Taiwan, MP/NN, -1/1)
12/16197  -0.84  5.34  0.53  13.98  -2.18  -7.62  -2.44  -0.81  0.32 KOR:  All 3 Presidential  candidates  to abide  by IMF  deal.
(Korea,  PN, 1)
________  ______  _  ______  PHI:  Stocks  decline  after peso slides. (Philippines, NN, 1)
12/17/97  3.28  2.95  6.16  -0.40  5.00  4.44  2.60  2.79  1.84 PM  Hashimoto  calls  for  a $15.4bn  income  tax cut  to
stimulate  the  economy.  Tax  cuts  to be implemented  in
current  fiscal  year  as part  of an economic  stimulus  package.
I________  I________  (Japan, FP, 1)
12/11897  0.59  9.96  -2.14  N/A  3.85  2.70  1.94  -0.14  9.39  Thailand  stocks  rose  after  Japanese  tax cut.  (Japan,  FP, 1)
12/19/97  -3.31  4.03  -4.23  N/A  -1.37  0.78  0.80  -2.33  -2.56 Trading  company  Toshuku  files  for bankruptcy;  raises
I________  _________  ________  I_______  __________  ________  specter of more to follow. (Japan, EN, -1)
12/22/97  -2.27  -1.11  -4.19  -10.36  -1.55  -0.08  -2.15  -0.76  -1.73 JPN:  Stocks  fall on  credit  worries  of more  bankruptcies.
(Japan,  NN,  1)
KOR:  Moody's  cuts  Korea's  credit  rating  to  junk  status
______  _______  ______  ______  ________  _______  (Korea, CR, -1)
12/23197  1.90  -1.88  NIA  -21.28  -2.91  -1.68  0.00  -0.56  ,  -5.13 Intemational  credit  rating  agencies  downgrade  the Korea's
foreign currency  debt. (Korea, CR, -1)
12/24(97  -0.25  -10.65  N/A  2.51  -1.21  0.04  1.14  0.10  0.14 Rupiah  slides  as  a research  reportfrom  lndoSuez  securities
puts  foreign  debt  at  twice  the  govt.  forecast.  (Indonesia,  EN,
I  I  ________  ____________  _____________  -1)I  Date  |HK  I  Indonesia  I  Japan  I  Korea  I Malaysla I Philippines  Singapore  Taiwan  Thailand  News In Bloomberg
1/6/98  -3.59  -11.34  N/A  N/A  -7.23  -4.87  -2.48  N/A  N/A  INO:  Govt. may announce a smaller budget for 1998
tomorrow, deepening problems  for companies. (Indonesia,
FP, -1)
MAL:  S&P  cuts foreign  currency  ratings.  (Malaysia.  CR,  -1)
1/6198  -1.64  -12.79  -1.10  4.61  -9.75  -10.49  -5.37  -2.36  -3.77  IND: Austere Indonesian  budget mandatel  by IMF may
deepen recession.  (Indonesia, NN, 1)
MAL: Ringgit falls as region's woes keep foreign investors
away. (Malaysia, NN, 1)
PHI: Banks widen bands in which the currency can be
traded. (Philippines,  MP, 1)
SNG: Stocks falls after Indonesian, Malaysian, and
Philippine currencies plunge.
(Indonesia/Malaysia/Philippines.  (NN/NN/MP,  0/0/-i)
117198  -5.95  -14.39  1.90  0.58  -6.41  -2.69  -3.53  -3.55  -0.94  HK: High local interest rates to protect currency threaten
profits in Hong Kong's real estate sector. (Hong Kong, NN,
1)
IND: Stocks fall on concems about corporate failure.
(Indonesia,  NN, 1)
TAI: Weak currency and rising interest rates cause stocks to
fall in Taiwan. (Taiwan, NN, 1)
SNG: Stocks fall as banks concemed that Asian currency
______  ________  .woes  would lead to bad debts. (Singapore, NN, 1)
1/8/98  -3.14  N/A  -0.30  1.06  -6.87  -4.24  -7.90  -0.52  -3.62  IMF may withdraw its bailout package for Indonesia.
(Indonesia,  IA, -1)
1/9198  -3.94  N/A  0.14  -3.60  0.84  -7.25  -3.86  0.13  -1.64  PHI: Fear that economy is headed for a recession.
(Philippines,  NN, 1)
SNG: Stocks plunge as investors bail out of region.
_______  ________  _______  ______  _  _________  ____(Singapore,  NN,  1)
1112198  -9.06  -7.27  -3.30  13.77  -4.52  2.09  -9.35  -5.90  -8.58  HK  Peregrine  files for liquidation. (Hong Kong, EN, -1)
JPN: PM fails to announce new economic stimulus
measures in speech to Parliament.  (Japan, PN, -1)
KOR: Govt. takes steps to ease a cash crunch. (South
Korea, MP, 1)
SNG: Stocks fall on Indonesian  financial problems amid
concems that loans to Indonesia may become bad debt.
(Indonesia,  NN, 1)
THA: Baht's dedine triggers concem over effect on
company  profits.  (Thailand,  NN,  1)
1113198  7.08  14.47  0.48  0.27  6.55  4.36  9.78  2.19  6.03  HK: Morgan Stanley strategists' comments that the Asian
bear market may be in its final stages. (Hong Kong, NN, 1)
IND: Govt. says that it will postpone 15 power and highway
projects to demonstrate commitment  to reforms. (Indonesia,
FP, -1)
SNG: Merger of two Singaporean  banks boosts investors'
confidence.(Singapore,  EN, 1)Date  IHK  I Indonesia  I  Japan  I  Korea  I Malaysia I  Philippines  Singapore  Taiwan  Thailand  News In Bloomberg
1114198  5.71  20.88  2.65  7.73  13.27  7.41  5.90  4.51  11.93  HK: Bank rates for 3 month loans fell by 2.3. (Hong Kong,
NN, 1)
Philippines: US Treasury Deputy Secretary Lawrence
Summers is dispatched to hold meetings with the Thai and
Indonesian leaders.  (US, PN, 1)
IND, MAL, THA: IMF announces reform package for
Indonesia and Suharto commits to the IMF package
(Indonesia, LAIPN,  1/1)
SNG: Deputy PM assures the nation that Singapore is not in
danger of a banking crisis. (Singapore, PN, 1)
TAI: Intel and Motorola announces strong eamings. (US,
EN, 1)
1115198  -7.25  -12.82  N/A  10.32  -3.04  4.25  -1.54  -0.02  -3.42  HK: Speculation  that property companies may defauLt.
(Hong Kong, NN, 1)
KORN: Officials  to travel to the US to ask intemational
creditors  to refinance $25bn short term debt. (Korea, IA, 1)
IND: Promises of economic reform (phasing out food/oil
subsidies and ending family monopolies) were met with
I_______  _  ______  ___  __  ______  I______  I________  ________  skepticism. (Indonesia, PN, 1)
1M19/98  5.44  -7.91  1.15  10.13  10.57  6.01  4.00  1.23  8.42  HK: Failing interest rates and brsk  sale of apartments raise
stocks. (Hong Kong, NN, 1)
KOR: Upgraded by intemational credit companies. (Korea,
CR, 1)
MAL: Michel Camdessus makes favorable comment about
economy. (Malaysia, IA, 1)
PHI: Peso rises prompting  optimism that Philippines would
be the 1  st to emerge from SE Asian crisis. (Philippines, NN,
SNG: Stocks rises as investors retumed to the market.
(Singapore, NN, 1)
THA: May be able to loosen terms of IMF bailout.
Camdessus says that govt. deserves full support. (Thailand,
IA,  1)
1/21198  -2.01  -9.42  1.84  -9.99  -4.69  -3.16  -0.06  2.60  2.89  Investors  question whether Korean economy and corporate
.______  . _______  _________  ______  ________  profits  could  rebound  fast  enough.  (Korea,  NN,  1)
1122198  -4.03  -9.58  0.16  -6.70  -4.39  -5.00  .-2.43  -0.84  -3.20  Suharto plans to serve a seventh term in office. (Indonesia,
PN, -1)
1126198  0.54  3.35  2.45  9.64  0.84  3.57  1.19  N/A  0.15  Govt. negotiators  close an agreement with intemational
creditors to exchange $25bn of commercial bank debt for
long term loans. (Korea, IA, 1)
1130/98  N/A  N/A  -2.65  N/A  N/A  7.32  N/A  N/A  10.19  PHI: Stocks soar on Investor  confidence. (Philippines, NN,
1)
_________  _________  ______  ________  _________  ________  _______  _________  THA:  Plans  to  lift  currency  controls. (Thailand, CC, 1)
2/2198  N/A  N/A  -0.08  -4.57  N/A  13.29  N/A  N/A  16.85  PHI: Stocks surge on hopes of economic recovery.
(Philippines, NN, 1)
_____I_  I  K  THA:  Lifts currency  controls. (Thailand, CC, 1)
2/4/98  -2.13  6.70  -0.29  -2.23  -2.13  -1.36  0.31  0.04  -14.36  Thailand stocks fall as investors concluded  that prices were
out of line with eaming prospects. (Thailand, NN, 1)I  Date  |HK  I  Indonesia I  Japan  I Korea  Malaysia  I  Philippines Singapore Taiwan I  Thailand  News  In Bloomberg
215198  1.35  -3.62  1.92  -3.33  6.14  -077  3.61  2.03  8.64  SNG:  PM  says  that  Singapore  is willing  participate  in a plan
to  guarantee  payment  of  goods  shipped  to Indonesia  for  use
in its export  industries.  (Singapore,  PN, 1)
THA:  Stocks  rally  as investors  bet  that  the  worst  of the
financial turmoil  is  over. (Thailand,  NN, 1)
2/10/98  -0.12  25.21  0.65  -3.93  10.60  3.08  1.36  -0.39  4.01 IND:  Suharto  said  that  the  govemment  should  'fix a certain
exchange  rate".  (Indonesia,  PN,  1)
MAL:  kinggit surges  on  expectations  that Indonesia  may
I______  ________  _______  I_introduce  a currency board. (Indonesia, PN,1)
2111/98  -0.62  -3.27  N/A  -5.08  -1.35  7.45  0.29  2.09  N/A Peso  surges  on growing  foreign  investments  that are
_______  .______  __I_  wagering that the worst is over (Philippine, NN, 1)
2/12198  -1.63  -10.44  N/A  -3.03  -11.76  -5.14  -2.84  0.55  N/A MAL:  The  IMF  may  not  support  Indonesian  plans  to  peg  the
rupiah  to the  dollar.  (Indonesia,  IA, -1)
PHI:  Stocks  fall on  concem  that  weakening  regional
currency may slow economic recovery. (Philippine, NN, 1)
2116/98  -1.52  -17.24  -0.99  -8.86  -7.95  -4.66  -6.40  -0.09  -5.05 IND:  The IMF  wams  that  it may  withhold  emergency  credit
to Indonesia  if it pegged  the currency.  (Indonesia,  IAIMP,  -
1/-I)
KOR,  MAL,  SNG:  The  IMF  may  not  support  Indonesian
plans  to peg the rupiah  to the dollar. (Indonesia, IA, -1)
2117198  1.06  8.81  0.04  -2.12  6.59  2.01  4.00  0.64  6.54 Indonesia  plans  to  go ahead  and  peg  its currency.
(Indonesia, PN, 1)
2126/98  3.06  4.43  0.40  0.98  2.04  1.96  1.77  3.30  2.37 New  Central  Banker  vows  to defend  the  currency.  (Taiwan,
PN, 1)
3/2198  -1.43  4.35  2.59  9.97  0.90  1.00  0.02  0.96  0.67 Japanese  lenders  agree  to reschedule  $24bn  in short  term
.______ ________  _______  Korean debt. (Korea, EN, 1)
3/4/98  -0.67  -7.44  -0.35  -0.12  -7.54  -2.19  -3.37  -2.44  -3.53 Central  Bank  announces  that Sime  Bank  incurred  1.57  bn
ringgit  in losses  for  the  6 months  ending  1998.  (Malaysia,
______  _______  ______  _____  _______  ~~~~~~~  ~~EN,  -1)
3/198  -4.94  -6.48  -1.91  -8.84  -4.95  -1.37  -0.53  -2.77  -5.70 HK: Beijing's  1998  budget  will do little  to boost  economic
growth.  (China,  FP,  -1)
KOR:  Bank  stocks  fall  on concern  that  losses  of banks  in
I___ ____  __  _  _Malaysia will be repeated  across Asia. (Malaysia, NN, 1)
3/9/98  0.69  - 11.42  -1.70  -1.46  -2.41  -0.25  -2.32  -0.02  0.04 IMF  to postpone  disbursement  of $3bn  from Indonesia's  aid
package  because  of delay  in implementing  reforms.
(Indonesia, IA,  -1)
3/13/98  1.38  1.70  2.58  1.69  4.28  0.22  1.51  -0.12  6.86  Sixth  consecutive  monthly  trade  surplus  for Thailand.
I_______  _________  _________  ________  (Thailand, EN, 1)
3/20)98  1.02  10.86  0.47  2.55  0.98  0.32  -1.16  0.49  0.87 Govt.  scotches  proposal  to peg  rupiah  to the  dollar  raising
_________  _________  ______  ________  _________  ________  _______  _______the  likelihood of an IMF agreement.  (Indonesia, IAWMP,  1/1)
3/30/98  -1.98  -1.72  -3.60  -4.72  -1.14  -0.86  -1.87  -0.69  -0.24 Govt.  figures  shows  that  Feb.  industrial  output  fell by  3.3.
_________  ________  _______  _________  ________  ________  (Japan,  EN  ,  -1)
4110/98  N/A  N/A  3.77  0.61  0.54  N/A  N/A  -0.09  1.25 The  Bank  of  Japan  intensifies  its  sale  of  dollars  to prop  up
I________  ________  ______  ________  the currency. (Japan, MP, -1)
4116/98  -1.61  -2.37  *2.83  -2.83  -3.21  -1.54  -2.18  -0.49  N/A G7  fails to come  up  with a solution  to revive  the sluggish
Japanese economy. (Japan, IA, -1)Date  |HK  I Indonesia  Japan  I  Korea  I  Malaysia  Philippines  |Singapore  I  Taiwan  I Thailand  |News  in Bloomberg
4127198  -2.65  -1.62  -3.69  -1.88  -2.94  -3.09  -1.13  -2.09  -1.99  Key economic indicators paint gloomy picture.
Unemployment  rose,  industrial  output,  and  consumer
_________  ________  _______  ________  spending  fell. (Japan,  EN, -1)
5/6/98  -0.44  -11.34  NiA  N/A  -7.75  -3.42  -1.89  -0.13  N/A  Student  riots create  political uncertainty  (Indonesia,  PN, -1)
Worries of unrest  in Indonesia  (Indonesia,  PN, -1)
5113198  -3.84  -18.34  -0.47  0.19  -5.28  -3.21  -4.98  -1.26  -4.40  Student  protests  calling for Suharto's  ouster escalate  in
I________  _______  _______  ________  Indonesian  capital.  (Indonesia,  PN, -1)
5/14/98  1.30  -11.37  0.01  0.81  4.66  -2.14  -1.28  -0.05  0.46  Violent protests  against  the Suharto  regime erupt.
____  ___  ___  ______  ___  ___  __  _  ____I_  (Indonesia,  PN, -1)
5118/98  -1.35  -17.81  -1.51  1.18  -4.07  0.08  -3.09  -1.38  -3.88  Calls for Suharto's  resignation  mount; cabinet  reshuffle
viewed  skeptically as  more radical measures  are believed  to
be needed  to restore  the  battered  economy.  (Indonesia,  PN,
5/20198  1.07  11.39  0.50  4.06  3.68  2.78  0.08  1.88  2.83  Suharto  may step  down. (Indonesia,  PN,  1)
CC:  Capital Controls
FP:  Fiscal Policy
MP:  Monetary Policy
IA:  International Agreements  (IMF, World Bank, US Banks etc.)
CR:  Credit Ratings
PN:  Political  News (includes Political Talk and Political Events)
NN:  No News (in the market)
EN:  Economic News (includes Financial Sector, Real Sector, and Extemal Sector)










Bold numbers represent market jitters.
The variable international agreements takes the value of I (-1) whenever the country accepts or becomes closer to (moves away from) accepting an agreement with international institutions.  Credit
ratings upgrade (downgrades) are denoted by I (-I).Good (Bad) economic news are denoted by I (-4). Expansionary (contractionary) monetary or fiscal policies are denoted by I (-1). The variable
capital controls takes the value I whenever restrictions on capital movements are lifted, -I whenever more restrictions are imposed. The variable political news takes the value I whenever there are
events that generate political stability, -I in the opposite cases.
The  parenthetical statements after each news event explain the country from which the news originated, our classification of the news, and the value of the corresponding dummy variable respectively.
For  example, for the last day of marketjitters (May 5, 1998) the news of President Suharto's possible resignation originated in Indonesia,  it is classified as political news (PN),  and it takes the value
of  I because the event added political stability.PlUCy  osegch  woriln8  $  SerS
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